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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION  
I THE AIM AND BACKGROUND TO THE DISSERTATION 
Under what circumstances and to what extent will employers be held liable for the sickness, 
injury and death of employees in the workplace? The initial answer to this question was 
seldom, if ever. The industrial revolution and the advent of the first modern industrial 
disasters spurred rapid legal development on this question. The law had to play catch up to 
these new capital intensive modes of production, and the closely associated development of 
the legal corporation, which permitted the separation of beneficial ownership from the 
management and operational control of the business. 
From initially placing the burden of injury almost exclusively on the injured 
employee, growing social awareness of the inherent risks in the workplace has seen an ever 
increasing willingness to hold the employer liable.1 This was initially driven by the courts, 
but developments were soon overtaken by the work of political activists and trade unions, 
which placed great pressure on business and the state to find more equitable systems of 
worker protection.2 This culminated in what is so often referred to as a new balance3 being 
struck in the form of comprehensive legislation to protect workers.  
In South Africa, this comprehensive legislation is the Compensation for Occupational 
Injuries and Diseases Act 3 of 1993 ('the COIDA'). The COIDA extinguishes an employee's 
common law rights to sue the employer for damages4 and instead introduces a no-fault 
system of compensation in which the employee is guaranteed an amount of compensation, 
when the harm from the accidents or occupational disease arises in the workplace.5 The 
compensation payable is in most situations significantly less to that which could be claimed 
at common law, being capped at a maximum of the total pecuniary loss to an employee.6 The 
employer thus avoids the risks associated with the possibility of costly damages claims while 
being obliged to fund the legislative compensation scheme through a tariff system. The tariffs 
                                                     
1 Wilson & Levy WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION VOLUME I (1939) viii, states that 'it [became] clear that 
industrial accidents could no longer be regarded as an aggregate of chance mishaps to unfortunate or careless 
individuals.' 
2 Benjamin P Understanding the Occupational Health and Safety Act and the Compensation for Occupational 
Injuries and Diseases Act (2011) 128. 
3 Ibid at 128; Debbie Budlender Labour Legislation in South Africa 1924-1945 (unpublished Masters of Arts 
and Sociology thesis, University of Cape Town, 1979) 211; D Millard 'For whom the bell tolls…interplay 
between law of delict and social security law in three modern compensation systems ' (2010) TSAR 535. 
4 COIDA s 35(1). 
5 Benjamin op cit note 2 at 128.  
6 COIDA section 63 and 67 read with the relevant schedules. 
7 
 
payable are dependent on the risks associated with the class of industry and the safety record 
of the individual business.7 
THE COIDA in recognition of the need to discourage employers from maintaining 
unsafe workplaces preserved a common law like8 fault based entitlement to what is termed 
'increased compensation' under s 56 of the COIDA. 9 The significance of the provision lies in 
the ability of an injured employee or their dependents to claim back the difference between 
the no-fault compensation paid and their respective pecuniary loss.10 While potentially having 
a dramatic impact on the compensation received the section is completely underutilised.11 
The reasons for this underutilisation are said to lie in potential claimants either being ignorant 
of the provisions or unable to institute claims.12  
This thesis will examine the interaction between the law that regulates workmen’s 
compensation and one aspect of how this modern system of law deals with the age old 
problem of negligently caused harm in the workplace. In particular, it argues that another 
important reason why claims for increased compensation are underutilised is because the 
common law defence of contributory negligence is said to apply to a claim for increased 
compensation. The result of this is that laws, which have since been abolished with the 
passing of the Apportionment of Damages Act 34 of 195613 ('the ADA') continue to apply in 
this one statute. The result is that cases developed over a century ago, which involved law on 
hobbled donkeys and steam powered trains, continues to have a major influence on whether a 
claim for increased compensation is successful or not.14 As will be shown, this position is 
untenable and a new interpretation of the provision for increased compensation is required. 
 
                                                     
7 Benjamin op cit note 2 at pp 141-2. 
8 Rautenbach IM 'The bill of rights and statutory intervention with common-law delictual remedies in 
compensation schemes for road accidents and work-related injuries and diseases' (2011) 3 Tydskrif vir die Suid-
Afrikaanse Reg 529, Rautenbach suggests the section is fault bases it may be expected to display characteristics 
of liability found  in delict. 
9 Benjamin op cit note 2 at 180, as Benjamin indicates this provision is the most important exception to the no-
fault system of compensation in the COIDA. 
10 COIDA s 56(4)(b). 
11 Oliver & Smit (eds) et al 'Employment Injuries and Diseases' in Oliver, Smit and Kalula (eds) Social Security. 
A Legal Analysis (2003) 459 and 498; Benjamin op cit note 2 at 180. 
12 Ibid; Rautenbach op cit note 8 at 529, speculates that a second reason for this could be that the same 
institution which must make an award of equitable no-fault compensation must also adjudicate on the claim for 
increased compensation. As this compensation can only be recovered through assessing tariff contribution of 
employers at a higher rate there may be a natural reluctance to award such claims. 
13 The Apportionment of Damages Act No. 34 of 1956. 
14 Williams G Joint Torts And Contributory Negligence: A Study of Concurrent Fault, First ed (1951) at 235, 
Williams quotes from an Irish judge in the 1947 case of Ross v. McQueen [1947] N.I. 81 at 83 who states: 




II STRUCTURE OF THE DISSERTATION 
The dissertation is divided into five chapters. Chapter Two traces developments in workers' 
compensation from its early common law roots to the legislative regime of the COIDA. As 
will be shown, many substantial hurdles at common law prevented an employee from 
successfully claiming damages against the employer. These common law defences were 
gradually whittled away over time and then later subsumed by legislative compensation 
regimes. These regimes increasingly recognized that the default position was to place liability 
on the employer in recognition of the employer's ability to control and maintain a safe 
working environment.  
Chapter Three examines the history of the common law defence of contributory 
negligence. It notes how the Roman, Roman-Dutch and English legal systems approached the 
issue of contributory negligence, and how the South African system awkwardly accepted the 
English approach. The law of contributory negligence had such a deleterious impact on a 
plaintiffs' claims, that the courts developed several glosses to alleviate this position. These 
glosses often appeared to overlap, conflict or completely undermine earlier positions of the 
court. The chapter concludes by indicating how these issues were resolved through legislative 
intervention in the form of the ADA. The reforms the ADA introduced were however never 
applied to the COIDA. 
Chapter Four examines the South African courts’ jurisprudence around the continued 
application of the defence of contributory negligence to claims for increased compensation. It 
is shown how originally the courts incorporated existing principles on the common law into a 
reading of the statute. However, later rulings of the court failed to contextualise these 
interpretations and take cognisance of the significant developments in the common law, as 
well as legislative developments. In the result a system which had clearly been recognised as 
unworkable, and replaced by legislation in every other avenue of the law, was allowed to 
operate unchallenged for 60 years.  
Having illustrated the deeply problematic status quo, Chapter Five concludes by 
considering three possible ways forward: the continuation of the status quo, the elimination of 
contributory negligence from section 56 jurisprudence altogether and the application of the 





CHAPTER 2: AN OVERVIEW OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION  
I. THE COMMON LAW ROOTS OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION  
Before the emergence of statutory systems of compensation, the common law held sway. 
Many of the common law defences that existed in the 19th and early 20th century have now 
been ameliorated or abolished, either through developments in the common law or as a result 
of legislative reform. As is shown here, many of the common law defences could only have 
arisen in the social milieu of laissez fair capitalism of the 19th century with its promotion of 
an individualistic political philosophy.15  
In many respects the system of delict was ill prepared to deal with the demands of a 
modern industrialised society. However, where it failed, and harsh consequences proceeded 
to follow, these came in conflict with co-developing notions of social-democratic justice, the 
result was the necessity for legal development. Some of these harsh rules and their 
development are discussed here in order to contextualise the defence of contributory 
negligence, and demonstrate the movement towards greater employer liability. 
The early English case of Priestly v Fowler (1837) 150 ER 1030 ('Fowler') is said to 
introduce two of these defences.16 The first is the rule of 'common employment' or what was 
termed the 'fellow servant rule.' It is a rule in terms of which an employee is prevented from 
claiming damages against the employer for an injury resulting from the negligence of a co-
worker with whom they were in 'common employment.'17 The judgement clearly shows that 
the judge considered as absurd, the notion that a master could be held responsible for the 
negligence of his fellow servants.18 It is clear that the judgment is informed by an 
understanding of employment taking place in the context of small scale; family owned 
enterprise, and does not anticipate the enormous changes that would be wrought by 
industrialisation and the emergence of large and depersonalised corporations.19 
The timing of the judgment could not have been worse with the boom in industry 
from the industrial revolution. Large enterprises, owned and controlled by depersonalised 
                                                     
15 Fleming James Jr 'Contributory Negligence' (1953) 5 Yale Law Journal at 695. 
16 Malone, Plant & Little Workers' Compensation And Employment Rights: Cases And Materials 2 ed (1982) 2, 






corporations could only act through their employees20 and as a result the rule threatened to 
bring an end to corporate liability for negligent harm to employees21  
An offshoot of the fellow servant rule, and also said to originate from the case of 
Fowler is the defence of volenti non fit injuria.22 The rule is said to apply where a person 
consents to take certain risks which would otherwise allow for an action in delict.23 An 
example of such consent could be consenting to work in a dangerous work environment.24 
The injustice produced by the rule lead to its continual reform and erosion until it was 
eventually abolished by statutory reform.  
Restrictions on the fellow servant rule were introduced through chains of vicarious 
liability as well as the introduction of certain non-derogable duties on the employer.25 Under 
the Roman law it was only the actions of slaves, and not the actions of free servants that 
could be attributed to the Master.26 The Roman-Dutch authorities are conflicted on the 
subject, but the furthest they go is to impose liability on a party expressly entrusted with 
some duty by the master.27 The non-derogable duties imposed on an employer were 
collectively described as, 'the duty to provide a reasonably safe working environment.'28 As a 
result of this, the fellow servant rule was restricted significantly, as the employer became 
responsible for those employees who negligently failed to ensure a safe working 
environment.29 Eventually in 1914 the Appellate Division in the case of Mkkize v Martens 
1914 A.D. 733 came to accept the broad English doctrine, now applied under our law, which 
holds the employer strictly liable for the wrongs of his servants which are committed in the 
course of their employment.30 
As McKerron has noted in agreement with Pollock, the best explanation for the 
expansion of vicarious liability, is based on the argument that the party was acting in 
furtherance of another's aims, and that such person should therefore ensure that in as far as 
these aims are pursued people should not be harmed by them.31 The learned author then 
                                                     
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid at 3. 
22 Ibid. 
23 R. G McKerron The Law of Delict 7 ed (1971) at 67.  
24 Ibid. 
25 Malone op cit note 16 at 4. 
26 McKerron op cit note 23 at 89. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Malone op cit note 16 at 6. 
29 Ibid at 5. 
30 McKerron op cit note 23 at 89 references the case of Mkkize v Martens 1914 A.D 733. 
31 Ibid at 90. 
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further submits that such a rule is subject to much qualification and in reality the issue is 
really one of public policy.32 Corporations play a major role in the affairs of the world, if they 
could not be held liable, a great many people would have no effective redress.33 Society could 
not tolerate the situation where ones private gain came at such expense. 
Arising also in the 19th century was the defence of contributory negligence, which 
had application more generally, including outside of the employment context34 Here, the rule 
was that the slightest degree of negligence contributing to an accident by either party would 
defeat a claim for damages.35 The most important exception to the rule, which the courts 
developed in order to mitigate its harsh application was the 'last opportunity' rule.36 The rule 
stated that despite of the negligence of the plaintiff if the defendant had the last opportunity 
of avoiding the accident and failed to do so they would be solely liable.37 
The above rules could only have arisen in the social context of the emergence of the 
industrial revolution. At this time, the expansion of industry was seen as a great social good 
and any fetters on it were strongly opposed by those in power.38 In such a social context it is 
easy enough to see how strong considerations of individual fault could take on an appearance 
of moral justification and fairness in excluding liability.39 The defence of contributory 
negligence, with ever increasing restrictions, would come to play a key role in limiting the 
liability of an employer for the consequences of negligently caused harm.40. 
Notwithstanding the changes to the common law, intended to mitigate the inequitable 
impact on workers and their dependents injured or killed in the course and scope of their 
employment, the cost and difficulty associated with the recovery of damages remained an 
almost insuperable obstacle to achieving justice. In South Africa this led to the enactment of 
legislation providing for the compensation of workers and the dependents of workers injured 
or killed in the course and scope of their employment on a no-fault basis through a system of 
compulsory insurance that we know today as workmen's compensation. 
                                                     
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Malone op cit note 16 at 9. 
35 P.Q.R Boberg The Law of Delict: Aquilian Liability (1984) at 653; Williams op cit note 14 at 223; Shatwell, 
K O 'Contributory Negligence and Apportionment Statutes' (1949) 1(2) University of Western Australia Law 
Review at 146, while most commentators understand the case to introduce the 'stale mate rule' Shatwell 
uniquely understands the case to introduce the 'last opportunity rule.' 
36 Malone op cit note 16 at 9. 
37 McKerron op cit note 23 at 63; South African Law Commission Report (Project 96) The Apportionment of 
Damages Act 34 of 1956 (2003) at p 4. 
38 Fleming op cit note 15 at 695. 
39 Ibid at 697. 
40 Ibid at 696. 
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Perhaps the most important principle to come out of this line of common law 
development was the duty on the employer to exercise reasonable care and diligence in 
providing a safe and healthy work environment. The principle is now enshrined in the 
Occupational Health and Safety Act 85 of 199341 ('the OHSA').42 Aspects of it are also seen 
in section 56 of the COIDA with its fault based claim for increased compensation.  
II. THE MODERN LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK OF WORKERS COMPENSATION  
The modern legislative framework of Occupational Health and Safety in South Africa is 
primarily made up of statutory provisions supplemented by the common law.43 This 
framework covers two broad and overlapping areas. The first aims to regulate and prevent 
injury, death and disease arising out of the work environment. The second deals with the 
entitlement to compensation when such events do occur.44 The OHSA and the Mine Health 
and Safety Act 29 of 199645 are the two major statutes which deal with the prevention of 
injury and disease.46 The COIDA and the Occupational Diseases in Mines and Works Act 78 
of 197347 are the only two statutes to deal with workers compensation.48  
The COIDA and the OHSA should be read together. The primary purpose of the 
OHSA is to place certain general and specific duties on the employer. General duties are 
phrased very widely and require that an employer act in all reasonably practicable ways in 
order to ensure dangers in the workplace are assessed and mitigated against.49 It is as a 
society that the standards of acceptability are set and the balance between the rights of 
employers and employees determined. This balance is set out in statutory form in the modern 
legal framework of Occupational Health and Safety in South Africa.50 Employees and their 
dependents have historically and still disproportionately carry the burden of injuries and 
diseases in the workplace.51 The systems of workers compensation and protection are there to 
correct this continuing historical imbalance.52 
                                                     
41 The Occupational Health and Safety Act No.85 of 1993. 
42 Benjamin op cit note 2 at 9. 
43 Ibid at 6. 
44 Ibid at 6.  
45 The Mine Health and Safety Act No. 29 of 1996. 
46 Benjamin op cit note note 2 at p 6.  
47 The Occupational Diseases in Mines and Works Act No. 78 of 1973 
48 Benjamin op cit note 2 at 6.  
49 Ibid at 7-9. 
50 Millard op cit note 3 at 535; Benjamin op cit note 2 at 9 & 128; Budlender op cit note 3 at 211. 
51 Benjamin op cit note 2 at 11. 
52 Ibid at 6. 
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The division between the legislation which provides compensation and that which 
aims to prevent injuries is porous. Under the COIDA each employer is required to pay a tariff 
towards the compensation fund for each worker employed. The amount paid per worker is 
dependent on the remuneration for that worker as well as the class of industry in which the 
employer operates.53 Thus, the tariff is in part based on the possible risk of injury that may 
occur in a specific business operation.54 The tariff may be raised in circumstances where the 
Director-General considers an accident record of a business to be less favourable than in 
comparable businesses.55 Tariff reimbursement may also be given where the employer 
exceeds the safety standards in comparable businesses.56 Importantly, the ability of the 
Director-General to increase the tariff may be activated where there has been a successful s 
56 claim against the employer. In these circumstances the Director-General may invoke s 
85(2) of the COIDA to raise the tariff.57 
The COIDA extinguishes an employee's entitlement to sue an employer for 
negligently caused harm.58 The COIDA is primarily based on a system of no-fault 
compensation. The basic underpinning of no-fault compensation systems is that, a person who 
benefits from running a business by relying on machinery and the labour of other persons, and 
essentially controls the organisation of the business, should be held responsible where an injury 
arises in this environment regardless of fault.59 This is because the employer controls and 
derives a profit from the businesses operations, and thus should be responsible for when such 
structures fail.60  
When the first Workmen's Compensation Act 25 of 191461 ('the 1914 WCA') came 
into force in South Africa, the Minister of Public Works indicated that its role was to provide 
moderate yet reasonable compensation to those vulnerable members of society who had little 
chance of successfully brining a delictual claim.62 Indeed, it was not only more difficult to 
bring a common law claim than a statutory claim for compensation but in either case the 
                                                     
53 Ibid at 140. 
54 Ibid at 141 states, 'For assessment purposes economic activity is divided into 23 classes and 104 sub-classes; 
with assesments ranging from 0.12 cents per R100 of earnings for activities such as banking and financial 
investment to R5.80 for underground minig activities…' 
55 Ibid at 142. 
56 Ibid at 142, COIDA s 85(3) provides for the reimbursement of payments where safety standards exceed those 
in the same industry. Benjamin however indicates that the provision has not been utilised in recent times. 
57 See s 56(7) read with s 85(2) of the COIDA.  
58 COIDA s 35(1). 
59 Millard op cit note 3 at 545. 
60 Ibid. 
61 The Workmen's Compensation Act No. 25 of 1914. 




plaintiff was faced with the prospect that the employer could be a person of straw.63 The 
development from earlier workmen's compensation statutes leading up to the COIDA is 
discussed below.  
III. THE LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COIDA  
The 1914 WCA was largely modelled on the equivalent English Act at the time.64 The 1914 
WCA permitted employees to choose between instituting a claim under the statute or under 
the common law, but not both. If the worker chose the statutory claim he would be required 
to provide the employer with notice of the accident65 and then attempt to reach a private 
agreement with the employer on the compensation to be paid.66 If no agreement was reached 
after two weeks the matter would be referred to a magistrate to decide the issue.67  
The 1917 Workmen's Compensation Act68 ("the 1917 WCA") expanded the coverage 
of the 1914 WCA to include certain industrial diseases.69 These diseases were contained in a 
schedule to the Act, with each disease linked to certain industries.70 If the disease was listed 
in a schedule and arose within the related industry, the disease was deemed to have arisen out 
of and in the course of employment and was thus compensatable. The employer would then 
bare the onus to rebut this finding.71 If the disease was not contained in a schedule or the 
disease arose in an industry where it was not scheduled no claim for compensation was 
possible even if it could be shown that such disease arose in the course and scope of 
employment.72 The only exception to the rule was where it could be shown that the injury 
arose not through a gradual process of exposure to some harmful substance but it could be 
shown to have arisen from an accident.73  
The shortfall of the 1914 and 1917 WCA was that many employers simply failed to 
insure themselves, which meant a claim could result in insolvency and a resulting minimum 
pay-out to the employee.74 This situation was considered to be problematic, particularly for 
larger employers who would be economically obliged to insure their employees, making 
                                                     
63 Benjamin op cit note 2 at 128; Millar op cit note 3 at 545. 
64 Budlender op cit note 3 at 204. 
65 Ibid at 205. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Ibid. 
68 The Workmens Compensation Act No. 13 of 1917. 
69 Budlender op cit note 3 at 205. 




74 Ibid at 206 - 207. 
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uninsured rivals more competitive.75 To deal with this situation the 1934 Workmen's 
Compensation Act76 ('the 1934 WCA') introduced compulsory insurance through a system of 
private insurers. This insurance scheme was now overseen by a Compensation 
Commissioner, who would act as the first point of call where the employer and employee 
couldn’t agree to a settlement.77 Only where the Compensation Commissioner failed to 
resolve a dispute would the matter be referred to a magistrate.78 This greatly reduced the need 
for incurring legal costs.79  
The 1934 WCA removed the right to choose between statutory compensation and a 
claim under the common law. However what was added was a claim for increased 
compensation, where the accident was 'due to' the employer's negligence or a set group of 
employees. This claim was however restricted to the plaintiff's pecuniary loss.80 Budlender 
conceives the extinguishing of the common law claims as a 'quid pro-quo' to business for 
agreeing to compulsory insurance.81 This is despite the fact that as Budlender states, many 
elements of business appeared not to be opposed to this form of compulsory insurance.82 
Indeed for many elements in business such insurance appeared to be in their own economic 
interests. 
The 1934 WCA importantly introduced an entitlement for the employer to claim back 
any money paid out to an employee as a result of the negligent actions of a third party. This 
principle appears to be in line with the principle of subrogation one finds in insurance law.83 
The 1934 WCA also introduced higher rates of compensation as well as introducing a system 
of compulsory Medical Aid.84 All in all, the 1934 WCA marked a great improvement in the 
position of big business, by removing the uncertainties around large damages claims and 
ensuring injured workers returned to employment as soon as possible, through provision of 
medical care.85 
There were however two major complaints which emerged from business in relation 
to the 1934 scheme. First, many employers still failed to insure themselves with policing of 
                                                     
75 Ibid at 207. 
76  
77 Ibid at 210. 
78 Ibid. 
79 Ibid at 211. 
80 Ibid. 







the Act being insufficient. Secondly, and more importantly, the scheme was run through 
private insurance companies. These companies were organised in such a way that competition 
was stifled and premiums were high.86 A state run scheme was thus considered by many in 
industry as a more feasible option.87 
Under the 1941 Workmen's Compensation Act ('the 1941 WCA') a state controlled 
compensation fund was set up.88 The 1941 WCA ended the system whereby employer and 
employee were to reach agreement on compensation, now the commissioner was empowered 
to investigate all accidents and adjudicate on the required compensation.89 The 19141 WCA 
had been based on two major aims, the first was that the insurance scheme would be run by 
the state and secondly that benefits paid out by the scheme would be higher.90 These two aims 
were said to be linked, as the state scheme would be cheaper, this would allow for higher 
payments without higher premiums being paid for by the companies.91 
The 1941 WCA also expanded the list of parties who could be held vicariously liable 
under a claim for increased compensation. This development may be linked to the 
developments in the common law around non-derogable rights and the fellow workmen rule. 
The provision was considered in the case of Looyen v Simmer & Jack 1952 (4) SA 547 
(A)92('Looyen'). In Looyen a claim for increased compensation under s 43 of the 1941 WCA 
was considered. The issue in that case was whether a shift-boss fell to be considered as one of 
the parties who could be considered as vicariously liable under s 43(a)(ii) (now s 56(1)(b) of 
the COIDA). This was important as if the shift boss was vicariously liable a claim for 
increased compensation would succeed. 
In determining the answer to this question the court considered the development of the 
workmen's compensation statutes from the 1914 WCA up until the 1941 WCA.93 In relation 
to the 1941 WCA the court looked at the relationship between the extinguishing of civil 
claims under s 7 of the 1934 WCA (now found under s 35 of the COIDA) and the 
introduction of the claim for increased compensation under s 43 of the 1941 WCA (now s 56 
of the COIDA). In respect of this the court states the following: 
                                                     
86 Ibid at 213. 
87 Ibid at 214. 




92 Looyen v Simmer &Jack Ltd & another 1952 (4) SA 547 (A). 
93 Ibid at 553-4. 
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'It is obvious that the Legislature did not intend to restore the Common Law liability 
completely so as to cover even accidents caused by fellow-workmen holding no position of 
authority whatsoever. But Parliament apparently intended the employer to be liable to pay 
increased compensation where someone appointed to be in charge of some part of the business 
had been negligent. In such a case it might well be thought fair to attribute the fault to the 
employer, whose business organisation had thus failed to reach a reasonable standard.'94[my 
emphasis.] 
In determining liability for a claim for increased compensation the common law 
principles around non-derogable rights and the fellow workman rule were thus influential.  
The 1993 COIDA largely followed the framework of the 1941 WCA. The COIDA 
however introduced certain important changes which included major changes to 
compensation for occupational diseases, and a broadening of the list of scheduled diseases.95 
Importantly it extended the protections for claims instituted through contracting of 
occupational diseases or injuries under s 35 by broadening the categories of parties 
considered as the employer.96 This had the effect of restricting common law claims against 
those employed in the same work environment. 
What is evident in the discussion above is that it was through a gradual process of 
contestation and development that the common law claims of employees were abolished and 
statutory claims broadened. The common law increasingly played a less prominent role and 
workers compensation a more significant one. As a result, the very nature of how an 
employer was held liable for accidents in the workplace changed. The new statutory systems 
however appeared to maintain certain aspects of the earlier common law system. The primary 
carryover from the common-law system was found in a claim for increased compensation. As 
will be shown in the next chapter, the common law defence of contributory negligence which 
is said to apply to this provision, can only produce absurdity and injustice, and should be 
abandoned, as the other common law principles discussed above have been.  
  
                                                     
94 Ibid at 557. 
95 Benjamin op cit note 2 at 125-6. 
96 Ibid at 125. 
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CHAPTER 3: THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMMON LAW 
DEFENCE OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE 
I THE EARLY ORIGINS OF THE DEFENCE OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE  
Prior to the last opportunity rule it was the principle of proximate cause which was the test to 
determine liability at common law.97 The first case to actually interpret a claim for increased 
compensation was under the 1934 WCA where the court expressly indicated the test was to 
determine the proximate cause of the accident.98 This pursuit of a proximate cause arose at a 
time when the court was obliged to find a single or more often phrased as the proximate 
cause of an accident.99 It is this principle of finding a proximate cause which is said to have 
often underlay the defence of contributory negligence'.100  
Throughout its development, the defence of contributory negligence, prior to the 
advent of the ADA, always acted in an 'all or nothing' fashion. That is, either the plaintiff 
succeeded with his claim in full or walked away with nothing.101 This is unfortunately the 
only consistent thing that can be said about the application of the defence.102 As one Judge 
noted, despite the attention the rule had received from many eminent jurists, the law on 
contributory negligence remained obscure.103 
A reason for this obscurity appears to be the haphazard way the law developed as a 
result of judges having to 'stretch' rigid rules which could often produce injustice to more just 
and reasonable ends. A result of this was a proliferation of case law, which has been referred 
to as a 'maze', an 'intellectual tyranny,'104 and lost in 'cloud cuckoo land.'105 The most important of 
these developments on the defence of contributory negligence was the last opportunity rule 
which formed the basic test to determine contributory negligence. All of this however came 
to an end with the introduction of apportionment legislation. In this chapter the historical 
development of the common law of contributory negligence is considered up until its 
abolition by the ADA. 
                                                     
97 Boberg op cit note 35 at 424, here Boberg draws on the case of Vorster v AA Mutual Insurance Association 
LTD 1982 (1) SA 145 (T) at 160 which quotes from the case of Pierce v Hau Mon 1944 (AD) at 197. 
98 Mey v South African Railways and Harbours 1937 CPD at 364. 
99 Fleming op cit note 15 at 693. 
100 Hau Mon supra note 97 at 197. 
101 Fleming op cit note 15 at 691; McKerron op cit note 23 at 320. 
102 Williams op cit note 14 at 235. 
103 Ibid at 235, quoting from Lord Wright in Caswell v. Powell Duffryn Associated Collieries, Ltd. [1940] A.C. 
152 at 179.  
104 Williams op cit note 14 at 236. 
105 Boberg op cit note 35 at 654. 
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(a) The Roman and Roman-Dutch Law 
We know that the Roman law took the approach that contributory negligence acted as a 
complete bar to a claim for increased compensation. This was in large part because the 
procedural formula of the then Acquilian action only allowed the judge to condemn in full, 
or to absolve the defendant completely106 This 'all or nothing' approach has been attributed 
to two controversial texts in the Digest.107 The first deals with the training javelin thrower, 
who injures a slave who is passing by. If the injury happens while training in the sports 
grounds the javelin thrower is not liable, while if practising outside the sports grounds he 
is liable.108 The second deals with a barber who sets up a chair near the sports ground, a 
ball hits his hand while he is shaving a slave and the slave is injured.109 While we do not 
know exactly how the Romans resolved the problem of liability in these cases it was likely 
through principles of fault and wrongfulness as opposed to causation.110 
A later Roman text by Pomponious which took on a great prominence stated: 'if 
anyone incurs loss which is his own fault, he is not regarded as incurring loss.'111 
Medieval scholars relied on this text in the 17th century to develop an approach to cases 
involving concurrent fault.112 The development retained the Roman all or nothing 
approach but made it clear that the matter should more clearly be decided on principles of 
fault, the fault of the plaintiff being set off against that of the defendant.113  
The modern Roman-Dutch usage appears to have embraced this principle and 
decided the matter based on a preponderance of fault. Only if the plaintiff's negligence was 
equal to or greater than that of the defendant would the claim be defeated.114 Where the 
defendant was the more negligent party the plaintiff's damages remained unaffected.115 
(b) The English Law 
Contributory Negligence was a relatively recent development in the English law said to 
first arise in the 1809 case of Butterfield v Forrester 11 East 60, 103 Eng. Rep. 926 (K.B. 
                                                     
106 Thoroughbred Breeders' Association v Price Waterhouse 2001 (4) SA 551 (SCA) at 605. 
107 Project 96 Report op cit note 37 at 3. 
108 Ibid at 4. 
109 Ibid at 4. 








1809) (Butterfield).116 In that case the plaintiff was riding home on his horse and collided 
with a pole which the defendant had negligently left lying across the road. The court held 
that the plaintiff could not claim damages as he himself had been riding negligently: 
'A party is not to cast himself upon an obstruction which has been made by the fault 
of another, and avail himself of it, if he does not himself use common and ordinary 
caution to be in the right… one person being in fault will not dispense with another's 
using ordinary care for himself.'117 
The judgement fails to clearly lay out what the specific principles are that apply to the 
facts of the case to justify the complete exclusion of liability on the part of the defendant. 
In the result, jurists have had to speculate ex-post facto not only on what rule the case 
introduced but on what principles it could be said to be based.118 The main interpretation is 
that it introduces what has been termed the 'stalemate rule' a rule where the slightest 
degree of negligence contributing to the accident by either party would defeat a claim for 
damages.119  
The absence of clear principles guiding the decision in the original case of 
Butterfield may be due to the general underdevelopment of the law of negligence, which 
only started to take clear shape as an independent ground of liability some 100 years later 
in the early 19th century.120 The law which was well established at this time was the law of 
causation.121 In this regard it been said that through the law of causation negligence as an 
independent ground of liability emerged.122 
The English approach to contributory negligence took no consideration of degrees 
of fault with the slightest negligence on the part of a plaintiff being sufficient to deny a 
claim for damages.123 To defeat a claim it was sufficient to show that the plaintiff had 
failed to act in his own best interests and as a result contributed to the harm suffered. The 
negligence in contributory negligence is thus distinct from an action in negligence.124  
                                                     
116 As indicated in the Project 96 Report op cit note 37 at 4 as well as in McKerron op cit note 23 at 58 and 63 as 
well as Fleming op cit note 15 at 692. 
117 Butterfield v Forrester 11 East 60, 103 Eng. Rep. 926 (K.B. 1809) at 927. 
118 Fleming op cit note 15 at 692.  
119 Boberg op cit note 35 at 653; Williams op cit note 14 at 223; Shatwell op cit note 35 at 146. 
120 Fleming op cit note 15 at 693. 
121 Ibid. 
122 Ibid. 
123 Williams op cit note 14 at 223; Project 96 Report op cit note 37 at 4; Boberg  op cit note 35 at 653. 
124 As indicated in J Neethling, J M Potgieter & P J Visser Law of Delict 5th ed (2006) at 150, there is a 
distinction between the action in negligence and a defence of contributory negligence primarily lying in the fact 
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This absolute nature of the defence of contributory negligence has been linked to 
earlier legal thinking on causation, where the court was obliged to find a single or more 
often referred to as a proximate cause of an accident.125 The approach may also be due to 
the fact that there was no law on apportionment at the time, except in maritime law.126 
This all or nothing approach could lead to harsh consequences, particularly where 
one of the parties sustained the whole of the loss while only being a minor cause of the 
harm. The courts blunted the unjust effects of the law by qualifying and raising certain 
exceptions to the rule.127 The most important of these exceptions introduced by the 
English courts during the 19th century was the last opportunity rule.128 The rule was 
specifically introduced to alleviate the harsh consequences of the stalemate rule.129 
The origins of the last opportunity rule are found in the case of Davies v Mann 
1809130 better known as the donkey case. The plaintiff had negligently left his donkey with 
its forefeet tied next to the side of the road. The defendant went speeding around a corner 
in his horse drawn wagon and crashed into the donkey and killed it.131 There was 
negligence on the side of both parties. The court however, instead of applying the 
stalemate rule held that despite the negligence of the plaintiff the defendant had the last 
opportunity of avoiding the collision and had failed to do so. In the result, despite the 
negligence of the plaintiff the defendant was held fully liable for the consequences of the 
accident.132  
(c) The South African law 
Earlier South African judgements refer to the Roman and Roman-Dutch law showing that the 
defence of contributory negligence had a Roman and Roman-Dutch pedigree.133 However, 
when applying the defence to modern railway and road accidents our courts relied mainly on 
                                                                                                                                                                     
that failing to act in one's own interests is not unlawful. However, negligence proper always refers to the breach 
of a legal right or duty. The result is that the negligence in the defence of contributory negligence cannot be 
considered as negligence. A better term for the defence would then be the defence of contributory fault. 
Importantly however the manner in which negligence is determined in the defence and the action are largely the 
same.  
125 Fleming op cit note 15 at 693. 
126 Ibid at 694. 
127 Boberg op cit note 35 at 653; McKerron op cit note 23 at 63. 
128 McKerron op cit note 23 at 63; Williams op cit note 14 at 223-4, indicates that in the US the defence is called 
the doctrine of the last clear chance and in Canada it is referred to as the doctrine of ultimate negligence. 
129 Hau Mon supra note 97 at 196. 
130 Davies v Mann (1809) 11 East 60. 
131 Project 96 Report op cit note 37 at 4. 
132 Ibid; McKerron op cit note 23 at 224. 
133 Boberg op cit note 35 at 661. 
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English decisions.134 The result was that in the late 19th and early 20th centuries the South 
African courts abandoned the Roman and Roman-Dutch principles of relative fault and 
instead adopted the English approach to contributory negligence.135 This fact was lamented 
by Watermeyer J in Pierce v Hau Mon 1944 AD 175 where he indicated that the law could 
have developed along different lines if the Roman-Dutch authorities had been more referred 
to in earlier cases.136 
The adoption of the English law included the early importation of the last opportunity 
rule.137 The South African courts however went even further than the English courts by 
developing the last-opportunity rule to apply to cases dealing with the negligence of third 
parties' as well.138 That is, where the negligence of a third party may disqualify a plaintiff 
from claiming increased compensation. This would occur in the instance where a passenger is 
injured by the negligence of the driver with whom she is travelling, and that of the negligent 
defendant driver.139  
The last opportunity rule was used as a practical tool to determine who acted last, or 
whose negligence operated later.140 The rule is most often spoken of in terms of which party 
had the last opportunity of avoiding the accident.141 The person with the last opportunity to 
act is termed the proximate cause of the accident (sometimes the sole, direct or effective 
cause) and is held fully and exclusively liable for the damages.142  
As with the English common law defence of contributory negligence, the rule is 
generally explained by the courts in terms of the law of causation.143 Boberg states that the 
last opportunity rule was not a test of comparative negligence, as the Roman and Roman-
Dutch law was, but a test of causation.144 McKerron indicates that legal causation is the 
principle on which the rule is based but subject to the court's finding of a single cause of the 
                                                     
134 Ibid. 
135 Ibid; Hau Mon supra note 97 at 195; Thoroughbred Breeders' supra note 106 at 606-7. 
136 Hau Mon supra note 97 at 195. 
137 Boberg op cit note 35 at 661; McKerron op cit note 23 at 64. 
138McKerron op cit note 23 at 64; Niehaus v Worcester Divisional Council 1932 CPD 53; South African 
Railways and Harbours v Acutt Worthington 1935 NPD 314.  
139 Niehaus ibid at 54-6. 
140 Project 96 Report op cit note 37 at 4.  
141 Ibid at 3, McKerron op cit note 23 at 321; Boberg op cit note 35 at 424, reference is to the case of Vorster 
supra note 97 at para 161 quoting Boberg in the 1970 Annual Survey of South African Law at 176. 
142Shatwell op cit note 35 at 152; McKerron op cit note 23 at 63. 
143 See the Project 96 Report op cit note 37 at 4; Boberg op cit note 35 at 653, calls it a test of causation not of 
comparative culpability; Hau Mon supra note 97 at 197. 
144 Boberg op cit note 35 at 653. 
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accident.145 Glanville however argues that the rule was sui generis, merely a bold attempt by 
the courts to 'do rough justice' and was never a branch of any legal doctrine.146 It was because 
judges felt a need to relate the rule to some legal doctrine that they would sometimes speak 
about the law as if its basis lay in principles of causation or remoteness.147  
II APPLICATION OF THE LAST OPPORTUNITY RULE UNDER THE DEFENCE OF 
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE 
We have seen that the defence of contributory negligence first applied the stalemate rule, 
before the last opportunity rule became the leading test of causation. In practice, the onus 
rested on the plaintiff to demonstrate that the defendant had the last opportunity to act to 
avoid the accident.148 If the plaintiff could not prove this, the stalemate rule applied. The 
exception to this was where there was a dependants claim, in that instance the defendant 
would be liable unless he could show that the last opportunity had rested with the deceased 
party. 149  
While the last opportunity rule had originally been introduced to mitigate the 
harshness of the stalemate rule, this rule too started to come under more scrutiny by the 
courts. Changing socio-economic conditions brought more complex factual matrixes 
which tended to reveal the inadequacies of the last opportunity rule.150 The courts response 
was not to develop a deeper understanding of the underpinnings of the law of contributory 
negligence, but rather to adapt, stretch and reinterpret the application of the law. Three of 
the most important adaptions are considered below. 
(a) The objective gloss creates an objective test 
The last opportunity rule was initially considered from the subjective perspective of the 
parties. That is, who in the circumstances, plaintiff or defendant, had actual knowledge of 
the dangerous situation and failed to avoid the accident. This development had unintended 
consequences. The most glaring of these was that the more attentive of the parties would 
often have the later opportunity of avoiding an accident.151 The result was a situation 
where the more prudent party would be punished, while the more negligent party got off 
with no liability. Such a situation could not be tolerated and thus the objective gloss was 
                                                     
145 McKerron op cit note 23 at 320. 
146 Williams op cit note 14 at 236. 
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148 McKerron op cit note23 at 321. 
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150 Shatwell op cit note 35 at 147. 
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adopted by both the English152 and South African Courts.153 
In England, the objective gloss is often attributed to the case of British Columbia 
Electric Rly. Co v Loach 1916 1 A.C. 719154 ('Loach') and holds that the party with the last 
opportunity to act is the one who if they had not been negligent would have had the last 
opportunity to act.155 Thus one moves from a question of who actually had the last 
opportunity to act to who would have had the last opportunity to act but for their 
negligence. 
In application the rule was problematic. If the test was applied by the plaintiff 
exclusively against the defendant, the plaintiff would generally succeed.156 Boberg states 
that the objective gloss spelt the end of the last opportunity rule.157 This was because there 
was no logical basis to apply the objective standard to only one party. However in 
applying the test to both parties a contradiction emerges. If both parties had acted to the 
objective standard of reasonableness there would have been no accident in the first place, 
as the entire accident is premised on the negligence of the parties causing the accident!158 
This attempted movement back in the cone of causation went too far, producing an 
unworkable result, which as Boberg states brought the law into the realm of ‘cloud-
cuckoo-land.'159  
(b) The principle of continuing negligence makes the determination of who has the last 
opportunity to act arbitrary 
This rule looked to determine the periods of time over which negligence could be said to 
operate. This rule allowed the application of the last opportunity rule to be avoided in 
certain instances. That was because, what may have looked like two consecutive acts of 
negligence could be determined as concurrent negligence, thus resulting in application of 
the stalemate rule.  
The principle of continuing negligence did this by eliminating the artificial 
distinction between 'static negligence' (leaving a cart unattended in the road) and 'active 
negligence' (driving a carriage into a static cart). While the party actively colliding with 
                                                     
152 Shatwell op cit note 35 at 148. 
153 McKerron op cit note 23 at 321; Hau Mon supra note 97 at 190. 
154 British Columbia Electric Rly. Co v Loach 1916 1 A.C. 719. 
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the cart may have had what appears to be the last opportunity to act, leaving the cart in the 
road is now considered as a continuation of the negligent act and thus both parties 
negligence is simultaneous and the stalemate rule applies.160  
In the case of Butterfield, Bayley J stated that, 'if he [the plaintiff] had used 
ordinary care he must have seen the obstruction; so that the accident appeared to happen 
entirely from his own fault.'161 As a result of this dicta later cases seemed to consider that 
between the driver and the static obstruction, legal responsibility would rest solely with 
the driver, even if he had not seen the obstruction.162 The absurdity of this outcome is 
demonstrated by an example. Suppose a party negligently leaves a barrel of dynamite in 
the road, another party then negligently crashes into it. Applying the reasoning above, in 
such an instance not only is the former party not liable but the latter party must pay for the 
damages as well as the destroyed dynamite.163 
To interpret Butterfield consistently Glanville argues that the case must be 
considered as an application of the principle of continuing negligence, and no liability 
arises as there is a concurrence of fault. The leaving of the pole in the road is an act of 
continuing negligence, with the rider not actually seeing the pole in time to stop meant 
there was a concurrence of fault.164 Thus the rule is considered as a gloss developed by the 
courts to mitigate the inflexibility of the last opportunity rule.165 
In practice, the rule of continuing negligence was unwieldy and afforded the court 
an unprincipled and unguided discretion, making predicting the outcome of any case 
difficult, and any decision open to being set aside on appeal.166 The rule demonstrates 
clear similarities to the objective gloss. In the Butterfield case had the objective gloss 
applied the stalemate rule may well have come into effect, as who could say in such an 
instance which party would have had the last opportunity to act had they not been 
negligent. 
 
                                                     
160 Shatwell op cit note 35 at 150. 
161 Williams op cit note 14 at 228. 
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 (c) The introduction of a test of comparative negligence goes against all earlier case law 
Glanville argues that Loach's case introduced a rule that could not be fitted within the 
rubric of the law of contributory negligence. Instead he argues the principle developed 
goes beyond the last opportunity rule and replaces it with a rule based on principles of 
comparative negligence.167 This then is something of a return to the Roman-Dutch 
approach of a system of comparative negligence. But such a rule which relies on principles 
of comparative fault has been consistently rejected by the South African and the English 
courts.168  
However, there have been other judgments, calling for a 'common sense' approach 
to contributory negligence, which may be said to embrace such an approach.169 This 
development has been taken up by some courts who have equated the defence with the 
'common sense' approach found in the modern law of causation.170 This then would lead to 
equating the law of contributory negligence with the current law of causation.171 The 
advantage to such an approach is clear. It would bring forth a consistency to the law. 
Secondly a flexible approach would allow the law to deal appropriately with nearly any 
factual scenario which a court may have to consider.172 
III THE ADA BRINGS AN END TO THE LAW OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE 
The defence of contributory negligence first applied the stalemate rule and when this was 
found inadequate adopted the last opportunity rule. When developments in industry 
showed the failings in the last opportunity rule, a further series of glosses developed. The 
result was a proliferation of case law, and legal rules which often seemed to contradict 
earlier rulings, or produce absurdity.173 The courts seemed unable to escape from these 
legal confines. 
As a result of the injustices produced by the law of contributory negligence the 
legislature chose to intervene. England adopted the Law Reform (Contributory 
Negligence) Act of 1945 and South Africa adopted the ADA. What the ADA did was 
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revolutionise the law by abolishing the 'all or nothing' approach of the courts and replacing 
this with the principles of apportionment of liability.174 As Williams has argued the basis 
of the rule was really about placing liability on the more negligent party.175 In the result 
once the principles of apportionment arose the very basis of the last opportunity rule fell 
away, and in its place a more logical and rational basis was introduced.176 
The courts are now no longer obliged to find a 'single proximate cause'177 to any 
accident and thus the basis for the last opportunity rule has fallen away.178 Since this time 
courts and legal writers have laid out a substantive body of authority for denying 
contributory negligence as a fixed rule of law.179 Some have even gone as far as to deny 
that that there ever was a 'last opportunity' rule.180 Significantly, many of these judicial 
doubts only came about in consequence of the passing of apportionment legislation.181 
Despite this however our courts have given a largely unqualified acceptance to the 
law of contributory negligence.182 In practice this has meant little. Since the ADA's 
passing in 1956 a new methodological approach to causation has developed. The result is 
now that courts are able to approach the issue of causation on far broader principles of 
common sense.183  
The injustices produced by the application of the defence of contributory 
negligence resulted in legislative intervention in the form of the ADA.184As a result the 
common law defence of contributory negligence has essentially ceased to exist and 
develop. The result is that where a court wishes to rely on this law, they will firstly have to 
sift through old case law which left unresolved many of the riddles of the defence of 
contributory negligence. Once the ADA passed resolving such riddles became merely 
academic and as such the law has not developed since the passing of the ADA. It could not 
have been contemplated by the legislature that such dated law could apply to a modern 
workers compensation statute.  
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CHAPTER 4: CASE LAW REGARDING S 56 OF THE COIDA  
I CLAIMING INCREASED COMPENSATION UNDER SECTION 56 OF THE COIDA 
The provision of s 56 of the COIDA allows an employee or in the case of death, his 
dependents to claim increased compensation where the disease is caused by the employer or 
certain groups of employees.185 Compensation is also claimable where an accident or 
occupational disease are caused by the above parties negligent failure to repair a patent 
defect, in plant material or condition of the premises, place of employment or equipment.186 
The most significant sections of s 56 of the COIDA are laid out below.  
'56. Increased compensation due to negligence of employer 
(1) If an employee meets with an accident or contracts an occupational disease which is due 
to the negligence- 
 (a) of his employer; 
(b) of an employee charged by the employer with the management or control of the  business 
or of any branch or department thereof; 
(c) of an employee who has the right to engage or discharge employees on behalf of  the 
employer; 
(d) of an engineer appointed to be in general charge of machinery, or of a person appointed to 
assist such engineer in terms of any regulation made   under the Minerals Act,  1991 (Act No. 
50 of 1991); or 
(e) of a person appointed to be in charge of machinery in terms of any regulation made under 
the Occupational Health and Safety Act, 1993 (Act No. 85 of 1993), the employee may, 
notwithstanding any provision to the contrary contained in this Act, apply to the 
commissioner for increased compensation in addition to the compensation normally payable 
in terms of this Act. 
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1) an accident or occupational disease shall be deemed 
also to be due to the negligence of the employer if it was caused by a patent defect in the 
condition of the premises, place of employment, equipment, material or machinery used in the 
business concerned, which defect the employer or a person referred to in paragraph (b), (c), 
(d) or (e) of subsection (1 ) has failed to remedy or cause to be remedied. 
(4) (a) If the Director-General is satisfied that the accident or occupational disease was 
due to negligence as referred to in subsection (1), he shall award the applicant such additional 
compensation as he may deem equitable. 
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(b) The amount of such additional compensation together with any other 
compensation awarded in terms of this Act shall not exceed the amount of the 
pecuniary loss which the applicant has in the opinion of the Director-General 
suffered or can reasonably be expected to suffer as a direct result of the said 
accident or occupational disease.' 
As is evidenced by s 56(4)(a), the Director-General has an equitable discretion to 
award increased compensation. The discretion is based on the same requirements as set out in 
56(1), that the accident or disease be 'due to' the parties and circumstances listed in s 56(1)(a) 
and (b). The Director-General needs to be 'satisfied' that this state of affairs exists before 
awarding increased compensation.  
While the phrase 'due to' has not been interpreted under the COIDA it has been 
interpreted in a series of cases under the 1934 WCA and the 1941 WCA to mean 'caused by.' 
Given that the COIDA provisions on increased compensation are worded in substantially the 
same manner the previous case law would be considered as valid.187 The full phrase in s 
56(1) then is to be read as 'caused by the negligence.' From this reading the courts have said 
the common law defence of contributory negligence is applicable to the statute. 
This interpretation would later come under scrutiny in another line of cases dealing 
with the application of the ADA to the COIDA had passed. In this line of cases it has been 
held that the ADA has no application to the COIDA. The basis of these decisions relies on 
what is said to be internal distinctions between damages and causation listed in the COIDA, 
where the ADA is said to only apply to damages and not compensation. 
In this section, these two lines of cases are critically considered. What the case law 
shows is that since 1937, the interpretation of the phrase 'due to' has not been the subject of 
any critical inquiry. As a result the fossilized principles of the common law defence of 
contributory negligence have applied to the statute. This has meant that the law on increased 
compensation has failed to keep pace with developments in the common law of causation as 
well as statutory developments in the COIDA.  
II HOW THE COURTS IMPORTED THE COMMON LAW DEFENCE OF 
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE INTO A CLAIM FOR INCREASED COMPENSATION  
The first case dealing with a claim for increased compensation was that of Mey v South 
African Railways and Harbours 1937 CPD 359 ('Mey') which considered a claim under s 
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34 of the 1934 WCA. While the case of Fred Saber (Pty), Ltd v Franks [1949] 1 All SA 
356 (A)188 ('Fed Saber'), which considered a claim under s 43(1) of the 1941 WCA, is 
often cited as the leading case on the interpretation of the phrase 'due to' in a claim for 
increased compensation, the reasoning of the court comes almost exclusively from the 
decision in Mey  
(a) Mey v South African Railways and Harbours 1937 (CPD) 
In Mey, Watermeyer J looks to interpret the phrase 'due to' in a claim for increased 
compensation. He indicates that the words 'due to' are constantly used and well known in 
relation to claims in delict.189 He then references an English law case which deals with 
such a claim, he specifically indicates that there is nothing unique in this case and that 
there are several others he could have relied on to demonstrate his point.190 The case 
mentioned deals with an action based on negligence in which the last opportunity rule is 
applied. Watermeyer J concludes that the words 'due to' mean 'caused by' in legal 
language.191  
Watermeyer J's conception of 'cause' in the phrase 'caused by' is then elaborated on 
when he states:  
'The lawyer is not concerned with the logical difficulties as to the meaning of a cause, he 
seeks to place responsibility for damage upon the party whose wrongful act is the main 
cause of the damage.'192 
The court, again drawing on English case law,193 determines that the inquiry into a 
claim for increased compensation requires applying the last opportunity rule, with its 
various qualifications and glosses, as the test to determine the proximate cause of the 
accident.194 Watermeyer J holds that the critical inquiry under s 34 is directed to 
determining the proximate cause of the accident.195 As we have seen, under the common 
law defence of contributory negligence this required an application of the last opportunity 
                                                     
188 Fred Saber (Pty), Ltd v Franks [1949] 1 All SA 356 (A) 
189 Mey supra note 98 at 362-3. 
190 Ibid at 363. 
191 Ibid. 
192 Ibid at 363. 
193 Ibid at 363-4. 




rule. Importantly, while the court relies on common law principles in interpreting the 
statute the extent to which these principles apply is never made clear.196 
(b) Fred Saber (Pty), Ltd v Franks 1949(A) 
The respondent, a woodworker operating at a circular saw had to have his hand amputated 
after it came in contact with the unguarded part of the circular blade which protruded 
below the work-table.197 The machine was new, and in breach of statute had been left on 
the factory floor without a protective guard.198 Franks, the injured employee, claimed that 
the accident was 'due to' the negligence of the employer in not supplying the required 
safety guards199 and in the alternative that the failure to provide such guards constituted a 
patent defect in the premises, which had 'caused' the accident, by the failure of the 
employer or one of his employees as referenced in ss 43(1)(a)(ii)-(v) knowingly or 
negligently failing to remedy such defect.200 
The acting workmen's' compensation commissioner awarded increased 
compensation to Franks after finding that the accident was 'due to' the negligence of the 
employer in allowing an unguarded machine to be used on the workshop premises.201 The 
employer objected to this decision arguing that the accident was unrelated to the 
negligence of the employer in allowing the unguarded machine on the premises but rather 
due to the negligence of Franks. The objection was disallowed by a majority, who ruled 
that in the circumstances, the actions of Franks constituted only momentary forgetfulness 
and thus could not be considered as negligent in the circumstances.202 
The case essentially turns on whether the act of the respondent in putting his hand 
under the table was negligent.203 The court formulates the test under s 43 of the 1941 
WCA in the following way: 
'Before dealing with the facts, it is necessary to construe the words “due to” in sec. 43 of the 
Workmen’s Compensation Act. In legal language these words mean “caused by”, and 
consequently the enquiry under sec. 43 is directed to ascertaining the cause of the accident. 
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See Mey v. South African Railways & Harbours (1937, C.P.D. 359 at p. 363). If the accident 
was, not-withstanding the negligence of the appellant caused by the respondent’s own 
negligence or if it was caused by the combined negligence of the appellant and the 
respondent, the respondent is not entitled to recover increased compensation under 
sec.43.'204[my emphasis] 
This interpretation of 'due to' comes directly from the case of Mey. It is the sole reference 
in Fred Saber dealing with how to interpret a claim for increased compensation under the 
statute. The court eventually agrees with the court a quo that Frank's actions are not 
negligent, he is rather only momentarily forgetful and thus the defence of contributory 
negligence fails.205 
What the cases of Mey and Fred Saber demonstrate is that the inquiry into an 
entitlement to compensation is an inquiry into the cause of the accident. That is the first 
point both of the courts make. However, in determining this cause, the courts apply the 
then current law of causation which applied the defence of contributory negligence. This 
would make perfect sense as there was no other way to determine a cause at this time. As 
indicated earlier prior to the last opportunity rule the test of causation was to determine the 
proximate cause. This then appears to be the overriding determination of a claim for 
compensation. 
(c) Grace v Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner and another 1967 (4) SA 137 (T) 
In this case, the plaintiff wished to argue that the ADA had altered the law of contributory 
negligence such that contributory negligence on the part of an employee would not defeat 
a claim for additional compensation.206 Counsel argued that since the passing of the ADA 
the courts have been permitted to apply the rinciples of apportionment to the statute. The 
court considers that the main obstacle to accepting this interpretation was the case of Fred 
Saber.207 Specifically, the court holds that while Fred Saber was not a decision on the 
operation of the law of contributory negligence, the court in reaching its decision 'clearly 
had in mind' the common law principles of contributory negligence.208 The result is that 
Fred Saber is considered to have interpreted the words 'due to' in s 43 so as to import the 
principles of contributory negligence at common law and to make these applicable to the 
statute. 
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The court thus considers itself bound by the decision unless it could be shown that 
the ADA had been amended by s 43 of the 1941 WCA such that the Fred Saber judgement 
was no longer binding.209 Using principles of statutory interpretation the court argues that 
the ADA on its face does not apply to the WCA and that it is possible to interpret the two 
acts consistently with no absurdity arising. The basis of this interpretation is two-fold. 
First, the ADA only makes reference to damages, not compensation. Secondly, the WCA 
itself draws a distinction between damages and compensation in sections 7(a) & (b) and 
8(1)(a) of the 1941 WCA.210 On this basis the court holds that the ADA has no application 
to the 1941 WCA. 
The reasoning of the court is problematic in several respects. Instead of laying 
emphasis on the general test laid out in Mey and Fred Saber, being to determine the 'cause' 
of the accident the court gets bogged down in the defence of contributory negligence. 
Then court then gives a narrow interpretation of the 1941 WCA to justify the previous 
precedents of the court. These again focus on the distinction between damages and 
compensation in the COIDA. The leading textbook on damages has indicated this division 
between compensation and damages is 'unrealistic.'211 
(d) Young v Workmen's Compensation Commissioner and Another 1998 (T). 
Young, is the most recent decision on a claim for increased compensation and the only case 
to consider such a claim in the constitutional era.212 The court with little scrutiny takes as 
trite the application of the common law defence of contributory negligence to a claim for 
increased compensation. The court however takes this one step further than under previous 
decisions and in so doing reveals the flaw in its reasoning:  
'As a prerequisite for a claim for additional or increased compensation, the Act requires 
proof by a workman that the accident in which he/she was injured was 'due to' the 
negligence of his employer or a person entrusted with the management of the business or 
any branch thereof of the employer, or due to a patent defect ...Once the workman 
surmounts this hurdle, it is open to the employer to show that the workman was also 
negligent and that his negligence contributed to the accident and therefore to his damage. 
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It is now trite law that the words 'due to' mean 'caused solely by', as was decided in Fred 
Saber (Pty) Ltd v Franks...'213[my emphasis] 
What the court does here is to confuse two aspects of the law of contributory negligence 
with the law of causation. First, as indicated in chapter three, the law of contributory 
negligence has always operated in an all or nothing manner. This was under the Roman 
and the Roman-Dutch law and the English law. However, the test used to determine the 
party who is contributory negligent has constantly been evolving, as we have seen the 
defence of contributory negligence was constantly open to reinterpretation by the courts.  
The inquiry into a claim for increased compensation as Mey and Fred Saber have 
indicated is an inquiry into the cause of the accident. This initially took the form of 
determining the 'proximate cause' of the accident until this test was replaced by the last 
opportunity rule. The tools of the time only allowed the courts to place liability on a single 
cause. What Young appears to have done is to raise this constantly evolving test to 
determine the cause of an accident into a fixed principle. It was never the rule that the 
accident must have been shown to be caused solely by a party; it was merely that liability 
could only be placed solely on a party or both parties concurrent act. To interpret this any 
other way would be in conflict with basic notions of causation. 
III THE LAW OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE IN PRACTICE   
What the case law above demonstrates is that the leading decisions on the law of contributory 
negligence always articulated the underlying test to a claim for increased compensation as 
determining the cause of the accident. This was in line with the common law of causation at 
the time, which spoke in terms of a proximate cause. This common law test however changed 
significantly with the passing of the ADA and has continued to evolve since then.  
Instead of our courts considering the underlying principles of causation on which the 
test under s 56 of the COIDA is premised and on which the common law of contributory 
negligence was said to be premised214 they got bogged down in the application of the 
common law defence of contributory negligence and its many glosses. The underlying 
principle of determining the cause of the harm was ignored.  
What is further apparent from the case law on increased compensation is the extent to 
which the common law defence of contributory negligence is applicable is unclear. In fact in 
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none of the cases considered under the claim for increased compensation are the glosses of 
contributory negligence truly applied. This is because in Mey, Fred Saber, and Young the 
court never has to apply the last opportunity rule. In Mey, factual causation is completely 
absent so the principles of contributory negligence do not apply. In Fred Saber and Young the 
plaintiff is found not to be negligent.  
As has been suggested in the chapter above, if these glosses were to apply to a claim 
for increased compensation under s 56 of the COIDA the outcome of the cases would be 
almost impossible to predict. Take the scenario in Fred Saber, for the point of argument we 
can assume that the plaintiff was also negligent. In such an instance who can be said to have 
had the last opportunity to act ? 
To answer this question requires applying the rules of continuing negligence as well 
as the objective gloss to the last opportunity rule. On the face of it the injured employee 
Franks appears to have the last opportunity to act when he put his hand under the table, 
however can you say the negligence of the employer ever ended? Was it not the fact that the 
negligence of leaving a saw in a dangerous unguarded position persisted up until the point he 
put his hand under the table. In that instance the stalemate rule would likely apply. 
However if we apply the objective gloss to the last opportunity rule and ask who 
would have had the last opportunity to avoid the accident if they had not been negligent the 
answer may be different. If the defendant had not been negligent the saw would never have 
been left in its unguarded state and the accident could never have manifested. But postulating 
such a question as 'would the employee then have the last opportunity to avoid the accident' is 
absurd. Cases like these show how the rule is completely unworkable, and as Boberg states, 
'lost in cloud cuckoo land.215' 
Yet another take is to apply the comparative test to the law of contributory 
negligence, which appears to surpass the last opportunity rule in its entirety. McKerron has 
phrased this notion slightly differently in his reference to the consideration of the respective 
parties 'responsibility.'216 Between the employer who allows an unguarded machine on the 
premises in breach of a regulation, or an employee who knowingly works on such a machine, 
and loses concentration and is injured who is the more responsible party? It is submitted 
many factors would require consideration and that such a test would resemble the current 
laws of causation.  
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From the above it is clear that the many glosses on the law of contributory negligence 
can produce various outcomes, when applied to the same factual circumstances. This is a 
result which could not be tolerated under the basic principle of the rule of law enshrined in 
the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996.217 In the final chapter, some 
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CHAPTER 5: A NEW APPROACH TO S 56 OF THE COIDA  
It has been shown above that the common law defence of contributory negligence is 
unworkable in practice, and could not reasonably be considered to apply to the COIDA. This 
then poses the question of how a claim for increased compensation should be interpreted. 
Previously, our courts were bound by principles of parliamentary sovereignty which 
restricted their ability to put the values of dignity and equality and the right of access to 
justice at the forefront of their considerations.218 The Constitution is now the supreme law219 
which means that all law including statutory provisions must be interpreted purposively in 
light of the Bill of Rights.220  
There are a number of interpretations of s 56 of the COIDA open to a court. First, it 
could be argued that the law should stay as it is. This argument has little legal support; 
however, there are a number of policy issues which are considered to be relevant to 
maintaining the status quo. Under consideration however these policy issues are found 
wanting showing there is little to justify the continued application of the common law 
defence of contributory negligence. 
The second possible interpretation is to argue that on a plain reading of the provisions 
of s 56 of the COIDA there is nothing to suggest that the common law defence of 
contributory negligence will apply. The default position would then be that a claim is 
established by reliance on the general laws of causation.221 This position would bring more 
consistency to the law in terms of applying the same principles of causation to the COIDA as 
under the common law. It would also continue the historical movement towards the risk of 
harm being more fairly weighted between the employer and employee. 
The third possible interpretation is to argue that the ADA applies to a claim for 
increased compensation. As with the second option this would bring more consistency to the 
common law and that under the COIDA as it relates to causation. It would also introduce the 
principles of apportionment. Many of the arguments in support of this position overlap with 
those with the second interpretation. Applying the ADA to the COIDA in distinction to the 
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second option would have the added benefit of ensuring that negligent third parties, who 
along with the employer negligently injure an employee, are treated in a more equitable 
manner. 
The thesis concludes by arguing that continuation of the status quo is constitutionally 
unworkable. Secondly whether the second or third interpretations are accepted, the outcome 
for a claimant seeking increased compensation would largely be the same.  
I THE CURRENT INTERPRETATION OFFERED BY THE COURTS IS LEFT TO STAND 
A possible argument in support of the status quo is that the compensation provided under the 
no-fault scheme of the COIDA is already sufficient, and that any increased compensation is 
neither required nor justified. In support of this there are Constitutional Court decisions that 
deal directly with the extinguishing of a common law claim and their replacement with lessor 
payouts under statutory schemes of insurance.  
In the case of Jooste v Score Supermarket Trading (Pty) Ltd (Minister of Labour 
Intervening) 1999222 (2) SA 1 (CC) ('Jooste') the court ruled that in terms of s 9(1) of the 
Constitution, the extinguishing of the common law claim for damages against the employer 
under s 35(1) of the COIDA was 'logically and rationally connected to the legitimate purpose 
of the compensation Act.'223 In reaching this conclusion, it must be said that the court 
considered an award of increased compensation under s 56(4) of the COIDA.224 The 
implication of this may be that the court indirectly supports the current interpretation of s 
56(4) of the COIDA, though the provision and its interpretation were never directly in issue 
before the court. 
In Law Society of South Africa and Others v Minister of Transport 225('Law 
Society') the court deals with the extinguishing and restriction of certain common law 
claims through a statutory amendment to the Road Accident Fund Act 56 of 1996 ('the 
RAF Act').226 Prior to amending s 21 of the RAF Act a victim or third party was entitled to 
claim damages from the owner, driver or employer of the driver of the vehicle where the 
person could not claim these damages from the fund itself.227 The new act abolished this 
common law claim with two exceptions (i) where the fund was unable to pay any 
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compensation and (ii) in the case of emotional shock arising from someone else other than 
the third party.228  
The case is significant for the fact that a more favourable interpretation of s 56 of 
the COIDA would essentially expand the scope of compensation. It is thus significant to 
consider why the court felt it was justified in limiting the common law claims of certain 
parties. The court essentially justifies this position by indicating that this will help the 
economic vitality of the Road Accident Fund and serve as an interim measure for the 
introduction of a fairer and more equitable social security system of compensation for 
victims, which the state indicated would be based on a system of no-fault liability.229 
It is submitted that these principles are not in point with regards to the COIDA. Firstly 
the road accident fund is paid for by all motorists based on a levy on fuel. A motorist has no 
control over the system in which vehicles operate; they must take the road system as they find 
it. It is clear that the conditions in the workplace are largely dependent on the actions of the 
employer, and the employee must essentially take the work place as they find it. The 
employer further has a direct interest and duty to ensure a safe working environment.230  
It is further evident, on a preliminary consideration of economic theories on the law of 
delict, that where a system permits the employer to avoid the full implications and costs 
associated with negligent conduct this will fail to ensure an adequate deterrence of such 
conduct, and result in loss not being spread fairly between the respective parties.231 The 
maximum payout to an employee is already capped at the pecuniary loss, to deny the 
possibility for this full pecuniary loss, where the employer has acted negligently would only 
skew the system of compensation more in favour of the employer. Further, in allowing a rule 
that is well recognised as being unpredictable and unjust this would infringe the foundational 
principles of the rule of law under the Constitution.232  
Another argument based on policy is that if the rule were to be abolished it would 
result in a greater number of accidents in the workplace. The reasoning behind this is that a 
plaintiff who knows the difficulties in bringing a successful claim will be more cautious in 
the workplace, knowing his negligent actions come with the possibility of higher costs. 
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Morally there is little to be said about such an argument. Studies indicate that an 
employee's conscious choice plays a negligible role in preventing accidents.233 Instead it is 
large corporations who manage and control the workings of their businesses who are in the 
strategic position to reduce the possibility of accidents in the workplace. This much is 
evidenced by the fact that since the introduction of no-fault compensation corporations 
have acted to reduce the number of accidents in the workplace.234 Secondly it is clearly 
evident that plaintiff's as a class are naturally incentivised to avoid bodily injury. If 
disability, mutilation and death are not incentive enough to act cautiously, little else is 
likely to do the job. 
The common-law rules of contributory negligence thus tend to burden the plaintiff 
disproportionately in relation to the employer. The loss incurred by a corporation is not to 
life and limb at most it may involve damage to property, and the raising of tariffs. In this 
way disproportionate pressures are put on an employee to the benefit of the employer. The 
rule operates in an unbalanced way, a careless defendant is let off each time a plaintiff is 
negligent, while the plaintiff is punished. Thus the defendant's negligence is immediately 
offset by their not being held responsible.235 The result is a rule which acts as a net 
incentive to carelessness on the part of the employer, not to safety. 236  
II THE COMMON LAW DEFENCE OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE DOES NOT 
APPLY TO A CLAIM FOR INCREASED COMPENSATION  
(a) A plain reading of s 56 of the COIDA 
The principle argument for why the ADA is not applicable to the COIDA has been that it 
internally distinguishes between a claim for compensation and one for damages, with the 
ADA only dealing with damages. The reason the courts even had to consider the exclusion of 
the ADA from the COIDA is based on what the default interpretation of a claim for increased 
compensation has been. This default position is that the common law defence of contributory 
negligence is applicable to the statute. This, as we have seen is supported in a line of cases 
since the decision in Mey. 
The decision in Mey forms the foundation on which the common law defence of 
contributory negligence is said to apply to the COIDA. In that case the court held that the 
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critical test for a claim for increased compensation was directed at determining the proximate 
cause of the accident.237 This notion of cause obliged the court to seek to place full liability 
on a single party. Where the proximate cause could not be established no claim was possible.  
It has been said that the underlying basis of the defence of contributory negligence are 
found in the principles of causation, subject to finding a single cause.238 Whereas the court in 
Mey was obliged to interpret the provision in line with the laws of causation prevalent at the 
time, it is submitted that a court now would be obliged to interpret the statute in line with the 
modern laws of causation to the exclusion of the common law defence of contributory 
negligence. On a plain reading of the provisions of s 56 of the COIDA there is nothing to 
suggest that the common law defence of contributory negligence should be available. A law 
graduate, versed in the principles underlying the Constitution, would likely not even give any 
cognisance to archaic defences in of the common law, let alone have an on idea how to apply 
them. 
The phrase 'due to' has already been interpreted to mean 'caused by', this interpretation 
is derived from the law of delict. The only known civil law legal basis to establish a causal 
relation is through the use of the principles of delict. In the absence of the COIDA clearly 
stating how an alternate test is to apply the default position must be to apply the general laws 
of causation to the exclusion of the common law defence of contributory negligence. 
To the extent that the choice between the first and second interpretations may be 
ambiguous certain principles of interpretation are important. The first is that the COIDA is a 
remedial statute and our courts have consistently stated that remedial legislation should be 
interpreted in favour of the class of employees to whom it is said to apply.239 Thus a more 
favourable interpretation to employees should be preferred. 
Secondly, as the case of Looyen indicates, the provisions of the statute are to be 
interpreted in a broad, as opposed to a narrow sense. 240 Thus the provisions of s 56 should be 
interpreted to describe the field of liability widely.241 Lastly, the very basis of the 
development of compensation legislation was to create a simpler and more efficient system of 
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compensation in comparison to the common law.242 Maintaining an obscure common law 
defence in the statute clearly goes against the very purpose of the legislation. 
Where courts were once bound to finding a single proximate cause to an accident, 
now such a search is not so arduous and causation is dealt with on common sense principles. 
It is submitted that under the Constitution there can only be one system of law dealing with 
general issues of causation.243 The abolition of the defence of contributory negligence in 
every other sphere of life through the ADA is testament to the fact that such principles are no 
longer in line with the boni-mores of society and the principles enshrined in the 
Constitution.244 
 (b) The importance of distinguishing between damages and damage causing events 
The phrase 'due to' in s 56(1) of the COIDA has been interpreted in light of the common law, 
and particularly the 'last-opportunity' rule. It is good to recall that under s 56(1) of the 
COIDA it is an 'accident' or 'occupational disease' which must be shown to be 'due to the 
negligence' of a set group of parties or their failure to repair a patent defect. The term 
'accident' is defined in the COIDA but this definition is self-referential and not particularly 
useful.245 Instead the courts have interpreted the word 'accident' in its popular and ordinary 
meaning as something which comes about unexpectedly or is not planned for or designed.246 
Up until the 1941 WCA a claim for increased compensation based on contracting an 
occupational disease could only be claimed where it could be shown that the disease arose in 
circumstances amounting to an accident.247 It was only with the 1993 COIDA that the 
provision regarding increased compensation expressly listed 'occupational diseases' alongside 
'accidents.' Thus, up until at least 1941 claims for increased compensation based on 
occupational diseases and accidents arising in the workplace were treated in the same way.  
The last opportunity rule was often phrased as a consideration of which party had the 
last opportunity to avoid the accident. The wording in the COIDA appears to be a carryover 
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of the common law 'last-opportunity rule'. It has historically been the case that a claim for 
increased compensation arises when the 'accident' is due to a party's negligence. This also 
appears to go clearly with the 'all or nothing' approach to issues of causation in the common 
law, where the court sought to a find a single proximate cause of the accident. Thus, on a 
plain reading of the COIDA the entitlement to increased compensation is based on avoiding 
an accident, as opposed to harm arising from an accident. 
This reasoning may however appear to come in conflict with developments in the law 
of causation and negligence. An important question which only clearly arose after the passing 
of the ADA is the distinction between what Neethling & Potgieter call, fault in respect of 
'damage' and fault in relation to the 'damage causing event.'248 This is important in the context 
of the law of contributory negligence, where up until now the reference in the relation to the 
'last-opportunity' rule has been a reference to the 'last-opportunity to avoid the accident.' 
In a series of cases in the 1970's this issue was considered by the courts. The first case 
was King v Pearl insurance Co Ltd 1970 1 SA 462 (W), ('King'). Colman J ruled that the 
failure of a plaintiff to wear a helmet while driving a scooter, which was involved in a 
collision with a motor vehicle, did not constitute contributory negligence.249 This was decided 
on the basis that the failure to wear a helmet bore no relation to the damage causing event 
(the accident). The court stated that it was only negligence in relation to the damage causing 
event (accidents) which were relevant for the purposes of the ADA.250  
The decision would be criticised in Bowkers Park Konmka Cooperative Ltd v SAR 
and H 1980 1 SA 91 (E) ('Bowkers'). Here the court, in reference to a reading of the word 
'damages' in s 1(1)(a) of the ADA espoused the now well accepted statement on contributory 
negligence, that claims under the ADA relate to fault in relation to damage not fault in 
relation to a damage causing events.251 Better put, under the law of delict a party is liable for 
causing damage not for causing of 'accidents' which lead to damage.252 The decision was 
supported in Union National South British Insurance Co Ltd v Vitoria 1982 1 SA 444 (A), 
('Vitoria'). In Vitoria the court ruled that the failure to wear a seat-belt was contributory 
negligent.253 
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Boberg supports the decision in Vitoria. He is critical of the position in Bowkers only 
in as much as he believes that it was always the case at common law that the courts 
considered the fault in relation to the harm not the fault in relation to the harm causing event 
for purposes of contributory negligence.254 His position is that the common law was not 
changed by the reference to 'damages' in the ADA. He states that it was only because there 
was no reason in earlier cases for making the distinction between the accident and the 
resulting harm that it was not brought up and definitively decided. Thus he states it was 
indeed always a question of the fault in relation to the harm.255 
Boberg's indication that this has always been the position under the common law is 
difficult to reconcile with the 'last opportunity rule.' Indeed in Boberg's own work and that of 
McKerron it is indicated that the last opportunity rule dealt with a consideration of who had 
the last opportunity to avoid the 'accident' by reasonable care.256 This is echoed by the leading 
English textbook by Williams.257 Even later textbooks seem to accept that this was the 
approach at common law.258  
The reference to the 'last opportunity to act' as Boberg indicates was merely 'loose' or 
imprecise speaking.259 In all cases it was really the harm and not the accident which Boberg 
indicates mattered.260 Indeed this is now an accepted trite principle in the law of delict that a 
claim in delict is a claim for harm caused, not for the causing of accidents.261  
As above, the wording in s 56 of the COIDA appears to be in conflict with this 
reasoning. The commissioner's discretion in awarding compensation depends exactly on her 
being satisfied that the accident or occupational disease arose as a result of the negligent 
act.262 Are these statutory provisions also the result of 'loose wording' or a 'loose 
understanding' of the principles of the common law?' It is suggested that they very well may 
be, given the history of how workers compensation developed. 
How would this principle then be applied to the COIDA, where the ADA is said not 
to be applicable and contributory negligence (now classified as contributing to the harm) is a 
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complete defence?263 If Boberg is right in that the 'last opportunity to act' related to damages, 
then the 'last opportunity rule' would be impossibly strict. A plaintiff contributing even in the 
slightest way to the harm caused would lose the claim completely. This would in practice 
have the effect of abolishing the last opportunity rule, and instead returning to a time when 
the slightest negligence in relation to the harm would disqualify a party from a claim.  
III THE ADA APPLIES TO THE COIDA 
Many of the arguments given above for why the common law defence of contributory 
negligence should not apply to the COIDA, could be used as negative justifications to apply 
the ADA to COIDA. In this section, one negative argument and one positive argument are 
made for the application of the ADA to the COIDA. These arguments arise in the context of 
claims for the recovery of damages and compensation, now contained under s 36 of the 
COIDA. 
The first argument is that the failure to apply the ADA to the COIDA would result in 
certain inequitable results which could not have been contemplated by the legislature. The 
second is the argument that the ADA indirectly applies to the COIDA in the context of a 
claim by the Director-General or employer individually liable against a negligent third party 
for the recovery of compensation paid to an employee. The implication of this is that if the 
ADA applies to a claim for compensation under s 36(b) then it should apply to a claim for 
compensation under s 56 of the COIDA. 
The relevant provisions of s 36 of the COIDA are laid out below:  
36. Recovery of damages and compensation paid from third parties.—(1) If an occupational 
injury or disease in respect of which compensation is payable, was caused in circumstances 
resulting in some person other than the employer of the employee concerned (in this section 
referred to as the “third party”) being liable for damages in respect of such injury or 
disease— 
(a) the employee may claim compensation in terms of this Act and may also institute 
action for damages in a court of law against the third party; and 
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(b) the Director-General or the employer by whom compensation is payable 
may institute action in a court of law against the third party for the recovery of 
compensation that he is obliged to pay in terms of this Act. 
The leading case dealing with a third party claim is South African Railways and Harbours 
v South African Stevedores Services Co Ltd 1983 (1) SA 1066 (A)264 ('Stevedores 
Services') which deals with a third party claim under the 1941 WCA. In this case the 
husband of Mrs G had been killed by the concurrent negligence of South African Railways 
and Harbours (SARH) and the South African Stevedores Services Co (SASS). The SARH 
as employer had duly paid out compensation to Mrs G as the dependent of the deceased. 
Mrs G then sued the SASS as a negligent third party under s 8(1)(a) for the outstanding 
amount of the damages suffered. The total amount of damages was R 20,300, of this 
SARH had already paid out R 13,287 in compensation; Mrs G's damages claim against 
SASS was thus R 7,012.  
When SASS was sued for damages it joined the SARH as a third party in terms of 
s 2(6) of the ADA claiming that the R 7,012 should be apportioned between itself and the 
SARH. It was common cause that the negligence of the SARH and SASS was in the ratio 
of 40/60. The SARH then filed a claim in terms of s 8 (1)(b) of the 1941 WCA to regain 
the monies paid out to Ms G. In the court a quo the damages paid by the third party and 
the compensation paid by the employer were apportioned between to the two parties in 
terms of the ADA. 
On appeal, the SARH argued that it was entitled to claim back from SASS the full 
amount which it had paid to the deceased (R13,287) and that this amount was not to be 
apportioned under the ADA. SASS raised three defences, two being relevant for our 
purposes. It firstly argued that s 8(1) of the 1941 WCA which deals with third party claims 
was of no use in cases where the employer had himself been negligent in relation to the 
accident.265 In the alternative SASS argued that s 1 and 2 of the ADA could be invoked by 
the defendant to apportion the claim for compensation. 
While SASS relied on certain English judgements to argue for apportionment, the 
court distinguished between the English and South African compensation regimes at the 
time. Importantly, under the English law the workman still had the option to proceed at 
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common law or claim under the statute.266 The court then distinguished between payment 
of compensation by the employer, and payment of damages by a third party, as payments 
whose underlying basis were no longer common to both parties. The employers claim was 
statutory in nature, while that of the employee against the third party was based on the 
common law.267 
As the court indicates, if both claims had been made under the common law, then 
the underlying basis of the claims would have been the same and s 2(6) of the ADA would 
have allowed for an apportionment between the parties. The 1941 WCA had radically 
changed this position by abolishing an employee's claim against the employer.268 The 
damages claim against the third party under s 8(1)(a) was thus delictual in nature, the 
basis of which is explained by the court as: 
'On the other hand, the Act does not impose on such third party any liability which does not 
exist at common law; the third party will be entitled to set up against a claim by a workman 
under s 8 (1)(a) such defences as he would ordinarily be entitled to raise against him in an 
action on delict. For example, prior to 1956 he would have been entitled to raise the defence 
of contributory negligence on the part of the workman, and since then he can, in such a case, 
claim an apportionment of damages by virtue of the provisions of s 1 of the 1956 Act. And it 
follows that the right of action conferred on the commissioner or the employer individually 
liable under s 8 (1)(b) is dependent on the workman having a right of action at common law 
for damages against the third party.' 269 [my emphasis] 
Thus, the common law defence of contributory negligence is not open to the third party, 
instead only the principles of apportionment apply under the ADA.270 It is submitted then 
in the absence of the defence of contributory negligence, the default position will be the 
general laws of causation apply in establishing the causal connection required under s 
36(1)(b). The court goes on to elaborate on this point: 
'If the commisioner or the employer individually liable wants to avail himself of his right of 
action under s 8 (1)(b), he must in the first instance show that, in so far as the accident is 
concerned, the workman would have a good cause of action against the third party in respect 
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of the injuries caused by him. That is a fundamental prerequisite. The commissioner (or the 
employer) cannot recover compensation under the section unless he can show that the third 
party was causally negligent in relation to the accident in which the workman was injured. It 
is common ground that in the instant case this condition has been satisfied.'271[my emphasis] 
The claim for compensation under s 8(1)(b) is dependent on showing a good 'cause of 
action.' A fundamental prerequisite of this is establishing a damages claim under s 
8(1)(a).'272 Section 8(1)(a) relies on the general laws of causation to the exclusion of the 
common law defence of contributory negligence. Thus a claim for compensation under s 
8(1)(b) will arise in circumstances where a damages claim has succeeded, even when that 
damages claim is apportioned.  
This result can arise in two possible ways. First, it could be said that a claim for 
compensation under s 8(1)(b) is established by reliance on the general laws of causation as 
applied under s 8(1)(a). There is however an alternative interpretation. That is the claim 
for compensation under s 8(1)(b) is based on a claim for damages under s 8(1)(a). As the 
claim under s 8(1)(a) allows for the application of the principles of apportionment (in 
circumstances where contributory negligence under the common law could act as a 
complete defence) under the ADA this means a claim for compensation under s 8(1)(b) is 
indirectly dependent on the application of the ADA. This will at least be the situation in 
certain cases. 
The argument goes some way to undermine a long line of precedent which have 
argued that the ADA has no application to claims for compensation under the COIDA. 
However does this claim for compensation against a third party have any relevance to a 
claim against a negligent employer ? It is submitted that it does. 
There are clear similarities between sections 56(1)(a) and s 36(1)(b).273 Both 
provisions use similar language to establish a causal connection, with s 36(1)(b) using the 
phrase 'was caused' and s 56(1)(a) using the phrase 'due to' interpreted as 'caused by.' 
Secondly both claims are dependent on a negligent act being the cause of the harm. In s 
56(1) it is the negligent act of the employer which must be the cause of the harm. Reading 
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s 36(1)(a) and s 36(1)(b) together it is the negligent act of the third party which is the 
prerequisite for a claim for compensation under s 36(1)(b). 
IV RECONCILING THE TWO ALTERNATE APPROACHES TO A CLAIM FOR 
INCREASED COMPENSATION  
The distinction between claims under the law of delict and under a compensation statute now 
often comes down to demarcating the entitlements under each system to avoid double 
compensation.274 This is not the problem under s 56 of the COIDA, which instead requires a 
consideration of how these branches of law overlap and interact. Determining the interaction 
between delictual claims and those under the COIDA is however made more difficult by the 
application of the ADA.  
The current interpretation of the COIDA as we have seen is stuck in a time when 
completely different principles governed the laws of delict. Since the introduction of the 
ADA, distinguishing between the common law of delict and the law under the ADA has 
become difficult. That is because the common law since 1956 has developed off the back of 
the application of the ADA. Thus what is now statutory law, and what is the common law is 
not completely clear. 
In this respect, it must be recognised that the 'distinct' approaches suggested above 
may be more alike than they are made out to be. That is, the application of the common law 
of causation as it relates to negligently caused harm, cannot as I see be separated from the 
principles which were introduced under the ADA. For purposes of this work however I do not 
think that is important. In the end, a damage causing event or the realisation of a risk in the 
widest sense is a matter of policy. 275 That is that both legal norms and factual circumstances 
must be determinative of whether a victim is entitled to compensation.276 The road accident fund 
and the COIDA are clear examples of private risks being brought into this social sphere.277  
It is clear that to continue interpreting s 56(1) of the COIDA in light of the common 
law defence of contributory negligence is unconstitutional. A rule which cannot be 
consistently applied, that is uncertain, that has been recognised widely as unjust should not be 
used to determine whether a claim for increased compensation will succeed. Such a rule 
breaches the most basic principles of the rule of law enshrined in the Constitution.278  
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The test of the last opportunity rule marked a grand attempt at applying a rigid rule to 
a myriad of factual circumstances. However, over time new factual scenarios showed this 
simply didn’t work. Whether the rule is considered as a rule of causation or 'responsibility' is 
of little value in how to interpret the statute.279 As the 1939 English Law revision Committee 
Report indicated:  
'In truth there is no such rule the question, as in all questions of liability for a tortious act, is, 
not who had the last opportunity of avoiding the mischief, but whose act caused the wrong.'280 
It is submitted that in the absence of the application of the defence of contributory 
negligence the general laws of causation should apply.281 A flexible rule is needed to deal 
with the many situations that arise in regard to negligently caused harm. The laws of legal 
causation already deal with the issue of 'proximity' in a more detailed and consistent way than 
the last opportunity rule; there is no need for another stream of law which overlaps with these 
principles.282  
The laws of causation are however dynamic and still the subject of controversy as the 
recent case of Lee v Minister for Correctional Services (Treatment Action Campaign and 
others as amici curiae) 2013 (2) BCLR 129 (CC)283, ('Lee') shows. In Lee the majority of the 
court ruled that the 'but for test' of factual causation was not inflexible.284 Applying a flexible 
approach was required to serve the ends of justice where an inflexible rule would lead to 
injustice.285 The Constitutional Court, while reiterating the need to take a 'common sense' 
approach, held that it was sufficient to show that a reasonable system would have made it 
'less likely' to contract TB and that this would have been enough to establish factual 
causation.286 What is important here is the court considered that a flexible test would be 
necessary where an inflexible approach would lead to injustice. 
Cameron J in his minority judgment criticises the majority judgment on three points. 
He firstly indicates that an increase in exposure to risk is not enough to infer probable 
causation.287 Secondly, that negligence is by its very nature the unreasonable increase of risk 
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of harm and that this should not be conflated with factual causation which still requires 
showing the connection to a specific harm.288 And lastly, that the approach by the majority 
leaves no consideration of how to weigh up the size of the risk incurred that would establish 
factual causation.289 Cameron J would thus have referred the matter back to the High Court in 
order to develop the law of causation. What both the majority and minority judgments 
however recognise is a rigid approach to causation will not work in certain situations. 
The case law on increased compensation has not dealt with a claim regarding an 
occupational disease. The express wording to include occupational diseases in a claim for 
increased compensation only arose with the 1993 COIDA. Up until this time it has always 
been 'accidents' to which the last opportunity rule has applied. Where a rigid approach of the 
common law has failed in situations of diseases, such as TB, the last opportunity rule is only 
certainly to be inappropriate. The referral to a last opportunity to avoid a disease such as 
silicosis could only ever have made any sense when such diseases were required to have 
arisen in a situation amounting to an accident. 
Causation remains a complex issue. As Neethling & Potgieter have stated, at the most 
basic level these developments in the law of causation are about the linking of facts and 
answering the question, does one fact arise out of another.290 They argue that because of how 
complex and dynamic our world and our reality is it is not possible to have a general test of 
causation.291 Neethling & Potgieter hold instead that causation must be based on the facts of 
each case.292 They come to the conclusion that there are as many tests for factual causation as 
there are causal links.293 
V CONCLUSION 
If a claim for increased compensation is dependent on application of the general laws of 
causation, the issues around the common law defence of contributory negligence become 
largely irrelevant. In making this award of compensation it must be noted that the Director-
General exercises an equitable discretion in determining the amount to be awarded. This 
discretion must account for the amount of no-fault compensation that has been awarded, and 
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is limited to awarding, at most, the difference between this compensation and the total 
pecuniary loss.294 
If the ADA was applied to a claim for increased compensation it would also result in 
the application of the common law of causation to the COIDA. It would further result in the 
application of the principles of apportionment under the ADA. How these principles would 
overlap with those of the equitable discretion exercised by the Director-General is unclear. It 
is submitted however that in all likelihood the impact would be minimal, as the principles of 
contributory negligence, are, as we have seen, founded on principles of equity.295 The 
application of the ADA to the COIDA would also have the added benefit of allowing the 
principles of apportionment to apply to a claim against a third party under s 36(1)(b) of the 
COIDA. 
The common law defence of contributory negligence was a harsh and inequitable rule 
that grew out of the clash between new and old forms of production. It favoured the interests 
of the emerging financial elite at the expense of ordinary people. The social milieu of the 
industrial revolution now seems a long way off, yet its principles and ethos have persisted for 
60 years since the ADA ruled it unacceptable in every other sphere of human life. This fact 
perhaps shows that despite progressive Constitutional legislation to protect the rights of 
workers, the organised interests of a small elite remain elevated above others. It is hoped that 
the abolition of the defence of contributory negligence, as applied to a claim for increased 
compensation under the COIDA, will go some way to levelling these interests by ensuring a 
more dignified life for workers and their dependents through elevated levels of compensation. 
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